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On the Dissection of Evasive Malware
Daniele Cono D’Elia, Emilio Coppa, Federico Palmaro, Lorenzo Cavallaro
Abstract—Complex malware samples feature measures to im-
pede automatic and manual analyses, making their investigation
cumbersome. While automatic characterization of malware ben-
efits from recently proposed designs for passive monitoring, the
subsequent dissection process still sees human analysts struggling
with adversarial behaviors, many of which also closely resemble
those studied for automatic systems. This gap affects the day-to-
day analysis of complex samples and researchers have not yet
attempted to bridge it. We make a first step down this road by
proposing a design that can reconcile transparency requirements
with manipulation capabilities required for dissection.
Our open-source prototype BluePill (i) offers a customizable
execution environment that remains stealthy when analysts
intervene to alter instructions and data or run third-party
tools, (ii) is extensible to counteract newly encountered anti-
analysis measures using insights from the dissection, and (iii) can
accommodate program analyses that aid analysts, as we explore
for taint analysis. On a set of highly evasive samples BluePill
resulted as stealthy as commercial sandboxes while offering new
intervention and customization capabilities for dissection.
Index Terms—Malware analysis, evasion, dissection, red pill,
dynamic binary instrumentation, reverse engineering, sandbox.
I. INTRODUCTION
The interest of security professionals in designing systems
and techniques to analyze and characterize malware behavior
is at odds with the intention of malware writers, who con-
stantly look for new ways to slip through the cracks of au-
tomatic solutions and employ assorted anti-analysis measures
to hinder manual dissection. Dynamic techniques in particular
extract information from the actions taken in a single execution
only. For this reason an armored sample can look for the
presence of a dynamic analysis system (such as a sandbox
or a debugger) and when one is found it may disguise itself
as benign, or try to circumvent or even break such system.
Prominent adversarial techniques for dynamic analysis in-
clude: environment evasion, to detect the presence of automatic
systems and manual tools (e.g., by looking for known artifacts
or introduced time overheads); time stalling strategies, to make
an analysis use up its time budget before any harm is carried
out; anti-reversing techniques, such as anti-tampering, anti-
hooking, and anti-debugging sequences [1].
The common analysis workflow for a complex sample
involves a high-level characterization of its behavior using
automatic analysis systems sufficiently robust to evasions, such
as a state-of-the-art sandbox. For a sample deemed worth
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investigating a manual in-depth code analysis then follows,
so to understand its functional capabilities and structure [2].
For automatic systems researchers have proposed over time
increasingly transparent execution monitoring designs, making
them more robust to fingerprinting attempts. Automatic sys-
tems nowadays provide valuable indicators for the next steps of
the analysis, although their output is occasionally inconclusive.
Let alone samples featuring new evasions [3], this may occur
also with targeted malware that looks for hardware or software
characteristics of the specific organization or industry it is
destined for [4], and with trigger-based malware that stays
dormant unless a specific trigger occurs [5].
Adversarial behavior for the subsequent manual stage has on
the contrary received less attention from academia. Analysts
today still spend a good deal of their time facing detection
techniques for their workspaces (e.g., virtualization defects,
tools) and the techniques they use (e.g., overheads, debugging
artifacts) that resemble those studied for automatic systems.
In addition to evasions specific to the manual stage, analysts
regularly dismantle techniques that automatic systems used in
the first stage already countered or were immune from. As
the analysis of complex samples remains a largely manual
process, shielding analysts from evasions may bring obvious
benefits in the use of their time, provided they can still access
fine-grained execution control abilities for dissection.
Contributions: We propose a human-centered dynamic
analysis system that can meet the day-to-day workflow of
analysts, smoothing the automatic-to-manual transition and
enhancing dissection capabilities for the manual stage. Ad-
ditionally its design favors the interaction between human and
machine analyses, an aspect that the state of the art lacks. Our
system brings introspection and customization abilities on top
of a stealthy execution environment. Its original features are:
• be robust to prominent adversarial techniques for auto-
matic and manual analyses (§IV-A, IV-C, VI-B), and cus-
tomizable using insights from dissection (§IV-E, VI-B);
• fine-grained execution control capabilities, including a
user-space debugger with stealthy live patching (§IV-B),
and cloaking of tools popular among analysts (§IV-A);
• let analysts orchestrate program analyses that can aid
dissection, as we explore for taint analysis (§IV-D, VI-C);
• be extensible by users in the face of new evasions (§VI-C)
or behaviors that deserve close investigation (§VI-B).
To back these capabilities, we choose to pursue transparency
by actively hiding run-time artifacts, including those that ana-
lysts introduce during dissection such as code patches. In the
envisioned design an observe-check-replace layer intercepts
evasive attempts to hide imperfections, and acts as foundations
for upper layers that assist analysts with more high-level
capabilities. The design is holistic: it offers an environment
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for fine-grained introspection (possibly enhanced by program
analysis capabilities) that later acts as an automatic stealthy
execution system to validate findings from dissection.
We embody our ideas in a prototype implementation
BluePill that fares well in stealthiness compared to commercial
sandboxing products specialized in evasive malware, making
a solid ground where to start dissection from. We build on
dynamic binary instrumentation to hook low-level and high-
level behavior of the execution, making hooks extensible by
the user without incurring semantic gaps in the process.
We report impressions from a preliminary user study where
ethical hackers dissected complex samples with BluePill and
with other publicly available solutions. We share our code with
the community at https://github.com/season-lab/bluepill/.
II. OVERVIEW
In the following we examine the transparency and flexibility
issues in the different stages of malware analysis that motivate
our work. We then illustrate the envisioned design, discussing
its use cases and why ease of extensibility is crucial for it.
A. Scenario
The quest for transparency in execution monitoring tech-
niques has driven the initial automatic characterization phase
away from the environments that analysts use right after to dis-
sect prominent samples. The automatic stage commonly takes
place in one or more sandbox systems that observe and record
execution facts for a sample in a controlled environment.
While early designs resorted to an in-guest component
to actively alter the execution of a sample for the sake of
monitoring (e.g., via API hooking [6] to intercept interactions
with the OS), recent systems operate passively from outside
virtualized [7] or emulated [8] guests. This choice results in a
reduced attack surface for red pill sequences that try to detect
analysis systems1. Out-of-guest designs trade transparency for
higher monitoring complexity from the incurred semantic gap,
which is the problem of interpreting guest memory contents
into a high-level semantic state of the running OS [9].
The subsequent manual analysis instead typically takes
place on workstations running VMware or VirtualBox images
with different software setups and powerful enough to hold
multiple save points (live snapshots for trial-and-error analy-
sis when debugging). Although custom loaders and drivers
may partially cloak VMs [10], operating inside the guest
implies that analysts may have to manually dismantle stalling
strategies, evasions via time measurements, and virtualization
red pills (e.g., CPU idiosyncrasies) that the previous stage
addressed automatically. This may require a laborious process
of instruction and function call interception and input/output
patching for each sample. Analysts obviously have to face
also techniques specific to dissection, like anti-tampering and
anti-debugging sequences that break their workflow.
Some non-academic works (e.g., [11]) have proposed de-
bugging interfaces for virtualization technologies used also in
automatic systems, but to the best of our knowledge those have
not gained much popularity among analysts so far. Possible
reasons may include complexity/limited capabilities in context
manipulation due to the semantic gap, lack of interoperability
with customary analysis and monitoring tools, and deploy
requirements (we shall return to this in §II-C and §VI-B).
The attentive reader would argue that virtualization artifacts
leave bare-metal analysis as the only sound approach to date
for observing a sample [12] (albeit real-world embodiments
may still be fingerprinted [13]). Let us consider also trigger-
based or targeted malware: for those an automatic analysis
may only reveal suspicious activities at best. Analysts may
try different pre-configured VM images, but eventually build
an ad-hoc one based on the insights gained from manual
dissection. Previous research suggests program analyses like
symbolic execution [14], [15] and taint analysis [4] to aid
dissection, but their integration in state-of-the-art analysis
systems usually conflicts with their transparency requirements.
These considerations motivated us to pursue a holistic
approach to the design of a dynamic malware analysis sys-
tem that could reconcile the transparency requirements for
automatic analyses with the levels of flexibility required by
human agents when they take over. This can happen after a
successful automatic characterization, or even from the start
with targeted or highly evasive samples.
B. Approach
We seek for a system that lets users analyze and control
instruction and data flows, both first-hand when debugging
and with third-party analyses and in-guest monitoring tools,
while providing a transparent environment to the code being
executed. To advance the state of the art we envision an
environment that is:
i) easy to deploy: it should integrate well with existing
infrastructure (like tools and VMs) for manual analysis;
ii) interactive: in contrast to the fixed working of current
systems, the user during the dissection can adjust the
configuration in use in light of new findings;
iii) customizable: the user can (re)define hooks for events
such as library and system calls without requiring deep
knowledge of neither the system nor OS internals;
iv) extensible: to cope with new anti-analysis patterns, it
should be intuitive enough for the user to encode coun-
termeasures.
Providing these features, particularly the first three, in a
passive design seemed difficult, especially when operating
from outside a virtualized analyzed system. We shall return
to this in §II-C and §III-B. We thus explored how an active
design against adversarial techniques can support such features
with transparency in mind. An active approach may let us
manipulate the perception of the environment for a running
sample, providing it with the illusion it has reached a victim
also during its dissection. To this end we propose an observe-
check-replace paradigm in the design:
• Observe: monitor classes of operations performed on the
environment possibly to trigger an anti-analysis behavior.
1The terms red pill and blue pill are popular science fiction memes that
refer to the truth of reality compared to a machine-generated dream world.
Originally used for CPU emulators detection [16], the expression “red pill” in
malware research nowadays may apply to general artifact detection techniques.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2020.2976559
Copyright (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. Y, XXX 2020 3
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) layer
BluePill
Target platform 
simulation layer
DBI artifacts anti-
evasion layer
Introspection
layer
Malware analysis system
Observe-check-replace layer
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Fig. 2. Use cases for the architecture: customizable sandbox (a), introspection
(b), and program analysis (c) scenario.
• Check: test whether the outcome differs from what ex-
pected in a reference environment chosen by the analyst.
• Replace: when it is necessary to fix a divergence, forge
the output(s) that would be visible to the sample.
These core primitives are designed to allow the upper layers
of the analysis stack to register callbacks that are invoked when
a sample executes instances of the monitored operations.
The proposed paradigm supports two categories of opera-
tions: stateless and stateful. For the former case the outcome
of an observation is independent of previous observations
of that operation. This is for instance the case with the
CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent Windows API. For the
latter case the system needs to track subsequent invocations
using an internal state. As an example, GetAdaptersInfo
queries the OS for network adapters and fails if the buffer
argument supplied to hold the result of the API call is too
small: on failure it passes back the required buffer size to the
caller that in turn uses it to set up another call to retrieve the
produced information.
Discussion: Anti-analysis techniques can be more com-
plex than single checks, and rely on an aggregate outcome of
combined, possibly parallel execution signatures. For instance,
IsDebuggerPresent returns whether a process is running
in the context of a debugger, and it may seem obvious that it
should always return false. However, a sample may then alter
the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Entry Block (PEB)
and repeat the call, which from now on shall return true. Such
aspects have to be taken carefully into account in the design
of an active monitoring system.
C. Architecture
We now elaborate on how to support observe-check-replace
operations and the high-level system features from §II-B.
Modifying the address space of a sample directly (e.g., via
DLL injection or from a debugger) would introduce a large
number of artifacts and limit the flexibility of the approach. For
instance, as modifications would be visible to the sample the
system should trap every access to altered regions. The pos-
sibility of self-modifying code and anti-disassembly tricks [1]
would then require single-step execution to capture low-level
red pills, or direct system calls that adversaries may make
from assembly code instead of using OS user-mode wrappers.
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) techniques offer
system-wide analysis capabilities with good transparency.
VMI technology builds on reverse engineering work on OS
internals to mitigate the semantic gap that occurs when trying
to access high-level concepts of the guest [1]. While VMI has
led to better designs for passive monitoring systems, the degree
of sophistication required to alter aspects of the execution can
be a daunting prospect not only for users but also for runtime
architects. As an example, while system call interposition is
simple to achieve, rewiring a library call to a user-defined
function or altering its input/output arguments with newly
allocated data structures can be tricky at best. The system also
has to treat results provided to a sample and its derived flows
(e.g., remote threads, child processes) differently from those
for the rest of the system to avoid instabilities and crashes [17].
Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) techniques naturally
inject extra functionality in a running program [18], which
will observe the same addresses (instructions and data) and
values (registers and memory) of a native execution [19]. DBI
engines abstract away many OS and architectural details to
the user, who can write callbacks in high-level languages and
access intuitive mechanisms to inspect function inputs and
outputs, CPU state, and instructions being executed. Also, they
let users invoke external functions (e.g., OS queries, API calls,
memory allocations) from the address space of the analyzed
program, easing introspection and manipulation activities. DBI
thus seems a reasonable choice for the goals we pursue.
We propose a DBI-based design where other layers build
on top of the observe-check-replace layer of §II-B. A target
platform simulation layer controls how monitored sources
can reveal information about the execution environment to a
sample. Depending on the strain being observed, the analyst
should be able to alter specific aspects of the hardware, OS,
and software environment to meet its expectations: to this aim
the layer provides a tailoring interface to the upper layers.
The layer also serves the purpose of hiding the presence of
third-party tools used by the analyst in the inspection.
We then devise an introspection layer with fine-grained
execution monitoring and altering capabilities. The layer ex-
poses debugging capabilities that are a staple for manual
dissection. Breakpoints are transparent to the running code,
as DBI engines can embed them as part of the trace fetching
mechanism [20]. We advance the state of the art with a
stealthy live patching mechanism that lets analysts alter a
sample’s instructions when debugging without having to worry
about anti-tampering schemes like checksums. The layer also
supports higher-level monitoring at function-call level; as the
DBI engine follows code executed in libraries, it does not incur
the limitations of binary rewriting or the complexity of VMI.
To conceal artifacts of the underlying execution and in-
strumentation technology, we complement the two layers
with a DBI artifacts anti-evasion layer. While DBI meets
transparency requirements for benevolent software, researchers
have discovered red pills for it (e.g., [21], [22], [23]). We
discuss the countermeasures we adopt in §IV-C.
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Figure 1 presents the overall architecture. We detail the
three layers in §IV, discussing popular ways for a sample to
detect analysis systems, how time-based techniques can hinder
dynamic analysis, and how our framework copes with such
aspects, providing details from our BluePill implementation.
D. Use Cases
As anticipated in §I, our design can back environments
that complement and build on each other to assist analysts
in multiple steps of their workflow. Figure 2 shows three use
cases that we implemented (§IV) and tested (§VI) in BluePill.
a) Customizable sandbox: Instead of being a competitor,
this mode can complement state-of-the-art automatic systems.
It lets analysts validate findings from manual inspection when
dealing with targeted malware or complex evasions: they can
devise provisional countermeasures and see if they let a sample
reveal its true colors. Analysts may experience a tedious trial-
and-error process of building different images only to match
shallow checks on software (e.g., Windows MUI packs for
Multilingual User Interface) or hardware characteristics (e.g.,
card readers) that can keep them busy sometimes even beyond
a day [24]. BluePill can be instructed to fake results for
common observation patterns. This mode also cloaks third-
party monitoring tools that are normally banned in automatic
systems, with the advantage of not having to reimplement
programs that analysts have used for years.
b) Introspection: The goal is to provide an environment
where analysts can dissect complex samples flagged by auto-
matic systems or for which the ignition conditions are yet to be
determined. We shield analysts from anti-analysis techniques
specific to this phase (e.g., debugger red pills, code checksums,
detection of popular analysis tools), and from general evasions
based on time and red pills for virtualization that would affect
also their workstations (§II-A). Compared to current open and
commercial systems, the novelty is that the user can (i) inspect
and alter execution under the same stealthy features offered for
the automatic stage and (ii) tailor environment characteristics
on the fly using insights from the dissection.
c) Program analysis: We enhance the previous mode
with the ability to define and run complex program anal-
yses over a sample. Previous research hinted at analyses
like symbolic execution and taint analysis to ease malware
reverse engineering, but their intrusiveness and overheads are
a concern for transparency. The design of BluePill can mitigate
these issues by allowing analysts to surgically apply them
to specific execution portions (§IV-D) and by altering the
perception of their overheads (§IV-A). In §VI-C we show uses
of taint analysis to dismantle previously unknown anti-analysis
measures and to dissect checks in targeted malware.
E. Extensibility
As the intended usage of our system targets human in-
teraction, the role and capabilities of users were pivotal in
its design. We envision a mechanism where observe-check-
replace hooks can dynamically be adapted based on in-
sights from inspection, resembling other security research [25]
where a human-in-the-loop paradigm overcomes limitations of
machine-based analyses. The user controls the behavior of the
system via an initial configuration file, but also dynamically
when debugging through a GUI that controls rogue values to
be returned for API calls and instructions of interest.
Embodiments of our approach shall not be restricted to pro-
viding stealthy ways to explore behaviors only in the presence
of known anti-analysis techniques, or they would be helplessly
crippled by new evasions. We thus expose DBI instrumentation
capabilities to the upper layers, allowing analysts to draw from
their experience and current insights from the analysis to tweak
existing hooks and, when needed, to add new ones in order to
face unsupported techniques or other relevant behaviors.
In §II-C we mentioned the shortcomings of other technolo-
gies for implementing such hooks in general. We find DBI
APIs sufficiently high-level and simple to be practical also for
users with limited experience with the system. Preliminary
results seem to back this belief: we present concrete examples
of humanly crafted countermeasures for prominent targeted
and evasive samples in §VI-C, and report on a different kind
of hooks for easing dissection in §VI-B.
III. COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS WORKS
We now review malware analysis research related to the
scope of this work, and discuss how our design compares to
systems from the literature and solutions used by professionals.
A. State of the Art
Automatic Analysis: As we mentioned in §II-A, solutions
based on hardware virtualization and full system emulation
have replaced early kernel and user-space monitoring designs
for automatic systems. Hardware virtualization enables several
forms of system monitoring with little performance over-
head, allowing for a quick characterization of many incoming
samples [7]. Full system emulation instead lets architects
instrument code with custom analyses during the execution, for
instance to monitor data flows crossing other components [26].
Both approaches make use of VMI (§II-C) to track the actions
of a sample (e.g., invoked system calls) and thus share the
benefits and the shortcomings of VMI techniques.
Unfortunately, dedicated adversaries may detect both ap-
proaches. Emulators are known for their defects [16] (patching
all of them in a practical manner is believed unattainable [27])
and timing differences [28]. Building a transparent VM mon-
itor for hardware-assisted virtualization is infeasible and im-
practical [29], as an adversary can leverage hardware, resource
(e.g., TLB pressure [30]), and timing (e.g., with privileged
instructions) discrepancies. [31], [32] investigate execution
divergences in different systems looking for environmental dif-
ferences that a sample could exploit. A normalization step then
discards spurious differences for a more accurate comparison
between profiles from different sandboxes [33], [34].
Yet malware may evade all available environments, advo-
cating for the construction of a reliable reference system.
BareCloud [12] proposes a bare-metal execution platform
more robust to fingerprinting as it only monitors network
traffic and analyzes disk contents after the execution. Transient
effects (e.g., a system call) on the environment cannot be
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recognized, as any form of in-guest monitoring would violate
transparency. The approach is well suited for detecting evasive
samples, but less appealing for analyzing their activities.
Manual Dissection: Debuggers are the Swiss Army knife
of analysts for carrying out in-depth studies of malware, thus
malware writers put significant effort in armoring their samples
with techniques to hinder them. Ferrie [35] describes about
80 debugger red pills involving CPU state and instructions,
structures like the PEB, Windows system and library calls,
and exceptional control flow. More complex detections in-
volve timing attacks and self-checksumming sequences that
executable protectors and packers offer as a commodity [36].
Analysts often use cloaking extensions like ScyllaHide and
TitanHide based on user and kernel-space hooking, but due
to limitations of the approach they cannot hide software
breakpoints and code patches, and occasionally break the
execution or the debugger itself. The cat-and-mouse game
with malware and packer authors also demands for continuous
updates, as these tools are regularly detected by recent versions
of executable protectors (we report our experience in §IV-C).
A few works dealt with transparent debugger designs.
rVMI [11] augments KVM with breakpoints and watchpoints,
using the Rekall forensic framework to select processes and
navigate kernel structures. It does not deal however with anti-
tampering schemes and timing attacks, and is affected by
virtualization red pills. MALT [27] uses the x86 System Man-
agement Mode to build an enclave where the debugger runs
alongside the OS on a bare-metal machine. MALT requires a
custom BIOS and communicates with the client via serial port;
it uses performance counters to implement single-stepping and
breakpoints, and rewrites time and MSR-related instructions to
mitigate side effects. Both techniques bring timely enhance-
ments in debugging capabilities for full-system analysis [11]
and for rootkits and other ring-0 malware [27]. For a more
general day-to-day usage however the technical shortcomings
reported in §II-A and §II-C may not be secondary: this view
was also reflected by the opinions of the users that we involved
in the dissection experiments of §VI-B.
Of a different flavor is the Cobra execution system [37]
for dissecting selected code streams in malware. Its runtime
exposes primitives to register overlay points: execution goes
unhindered until it reaches one, then a localized form of exe-
cution takes over. In this setting the runtime acts as an elegant
dynamic binary rewriter by breaking code in blocks, invoking
analysis routines at their boundaries, and rewriting control
transfers and other instructions in a block that can reveal its
presence. Unlike other execution technologies available at the
time, Cobra could thus withstand popular self-modifying and
self-checksumming sequences, and played an important role
in the WiLDCAT malware analysis framework [1].
Application of Program Analyses: Program analyses may
help in understanding the dynamics of a complex sample.
A few works focused on automatic extraction of the target
configuration, favoring subsequent in-depth inspections. [38]
proposes multi-path exploration to extract a more complete
view of a sample when its actions are triggered by specific
circumstances (e.g., upon receiving a command from the
network or when a certain file is present). [39] uses symbolic
Anti-analysis resistance BluePill VTemu VThw Bare-metal Manual
Environment artifacts
Timing attacks
Stalling strategies
Targeted checks
Debugger detection
TABLE I
ANTI-ANALYSIS RESISTANCE OF CURRENT TECHNOLOGIES.
Capabilities offered to users BluePill VTemu VThw Bare-metal
Ring-0 analysis
Inter-process analysis
Third-party monitoring
Function call interposition
User-provided analyses
Invisible breakpoints
Invisible patching of sample
TABLE II
FEATURES THAT CAN AID ANALYSTS IN MALWARE DISSECTION.
execution to identify trigger-based behavior in malware with
a main focus on time, keyboard, and network inputs as trigger
types. The main shortcomings of both works lie in their limited
efficiency and scalability [4], especially for complex samples.
GoldenEye [4] uses speculative execution to address fin-
gerprinting attempts by targeted malware. It dynamically con-
structs multiple environment spaces during a single execution
based on queries to APIs that are labeled beforehand. The
execution unit is the basic block: when the end of the block
is reached in all alternative environments, it trades space for
speed with heuristics that curtail the parallel space, keeping
only those settings most likely lead to interesting behaviors.
All these techniques are vulnerable to evasions targeting
artifacts of underlying technologies (QEMU for [38], DBI for
[39], [4]) and exceptional control flow. To the best of our
knowledge, their use is not very common among professionals.
In addition to scalability concerns, one reason could be that,
as they are fully autonomous systems, they may end up going
down a blind alley when dealing with unsupported or un-
precedented behaviors. Configuration extraction for complex
malware thus remains a compelling open problem.
B. Discussion
Table I summarizes how current approaches are affected
by anti-analysis measures. Circles are filled by one, two, or
three thirds to indicate when a goal is reached to a small,
good, or full extent, respectively. To make a fair comparison,
for each technology we depict an ideal system that combines
features implemented in different works. For emulation-based
virtualization we consider PyREBox [40] with the detection
of time stalling sequences from [41]. For hardware-assisted
virtualization we augment DRAKVUF [7] for Xen with the
debugger of rVMI [11] for KVM. For bare-metal solutions
we add the capabilities of MALT [27] to BareCloud [12]. For
manual analysis we consider a workstation with IDA Pro and
ScyllaHide, TitanHide, or Apate [42] for debugger red pills,
and the VM Cloak plugin from [43] for virtualization defects.
Bare-metal solutions are vulnerable only to stalling
strategies and targeted malware. VMI-based systems using
hardware-assisted virtualization fare quite well for classic eva-
sions; emulation-based ones can defuse time-stalling schemes,
but can hardly handle targeted samples automatically for the
reasons discussed in §III-A. An optimal implementation of our
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Name Technology Main protections Dissection capabilities Integration with other systems Public Year
Cobra [37] DBI Counter self-modifying and
self-checksumming code
Adding instrumentation to a sample WiLDCAT framework (proprietary) no 2006
Ether [44] VMI over VThw (Xen) Hide trap flag, patch rdtsc,
fake MSRs for sysenter
Coarse/fine-grained execution tracing, un-
packing detection through heuristics
- yes 2008
MAVMM [45] VMI over VThw (custom) VM monitor with smaller de-
tection surface
Non-interactive analysis data recording - yes 2009
BareBox [46] Bare-metal + kernel agent No virtualization artifacts Snapshot restore, syscall hooking (driver) - no 2011
SPECTRE [47] Bare-metal (SMM) Minimal intrusiveness Periodic triggering of analysis modules - no 2013
DRAKVUF [7] VMI over VThw (Xen) Mitigate evasions targeting
VM monitor
Non-interactive system-wide analysis,
syscall hooking
- yes 2014
MALT [27] Bare-metal (SMM) Minimal intrusiveness Debugging, snapshot restore Remote GDB (left for future work) no 2015
HOPS [48] Bare-metal (SMM, PCIe) Minimal intrusiveness Periodic snapshots, heuristics to locate
variables and determine stack traces
Built-in forensics tools no 2016
LO-PHI [49] Bare-metal (multi-sensor) Minimal intrusiveness RAM and disk capture, scriptable analy-
ses (currently post-mortem only)
Built-in forensics tools yes 2016
Apate [42] Manual (debugger plugin) Counter debugger red pills Debugging WinDbg yes 2017
PyREBox [40] VMI over VTemu (QEMU) Inherits from VMI Debugging, scriptable low-level callbacks Built-in forensics tools yes 2017
rVMI [11] VMI over VThw (KVM) Inherits from VMI Debugging Remote GDB, built-in forensics tools yes 2017
VM Cloak [43] Manual (debugger plugin) Counter hypervisor red pills Debugging WinDbg yes 2017
Nighthawk [50] Bare-metal (ME subsystem) Minimal trusted code base Monitoring RAM/SMRAM for integrity <does not apply> no 2019
TABLE III
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS SYSTEMS FROM ACADEMIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH THAT CAN AID IN MALWARE DISSECTION. PROTECTIONS WHEN
REPORTED IN ITALIC COME FROM THE CHOSEN UNDERLYING TECHNOLOGY INSTEAD OF FROM ACTIVE MEASURES TAKEN BY THE SYSTEM.
approach may perform as well as or sometimes even better
than existing VMI-based systems. As we detail in §IV-A the
platform simulation layer (§II-C) can hide artifacts, control the
time behavior of a malware, and expose tailoring primitives for
targeted checks. We address DBI-based debugging in §IV-B.
Table II compares analysis capabilities supported by
BluePill and current VMI and bare metal-based designs.
BluePill falls short for ring-0 analysis as DBI is confined to
user space; DBI can follow however system-wide flows like
remote threads and child processes. As VMI-based designs
operate in the VM monitor, allowing third-party analysis tools
to run in the guest to ease dissection is not a possibility (they
should be reimplemented outside it, if feasible). This is even
more the case with bare-metal approaches where the design
itself typically bans in-guest components such as tools [12].
BluePill enables more advanced interposition schemes for
system and library calls thanks to DBI (§II-B). Similar consid-
erations can be made for user analyses. While some forms of
VMI scripting to register callbacks and reason over events are
possible, their introspective power is limited by the underlying
forensic framework (while BluePill can make OS queries and
API calls directly) and the nature of the operation, as low-
level tasks (e.g., controlling instruction sequences) may require
modifications to QEMU, and not be practical at all under
hardware virtualization. Recently in the bare-metal realm LO-
PHI [49] explores analyses of memory and disk snapshots
transferred to an external machine, but present performance
concerns confine this to happen only upon execution end [49].
Finally, both hypervisor and bare metal-based debugging
interfaces offer invisible breakpoints but leave user changes to
the code of a sample visible. For hypervisors the page splitting
used for invisible breakpoints [51] may in principle be adapted
to this end, but the complexity [52] in synchronizing code and
data views with arbitrary changes would increase, and this may
be one reason behind such present limitation.
Table III summarizes the dissection capabilities and the pro-
tections against evasions of several dynamic analysis systems
from the literature. We selected systems meeting one or more
of the following criteria: the system (a) runs fixed analyses
customizable by an expert user, (b) offers shielded interactive
capabilities, or (c) minimizes the vulnerable surface. We can
see that the features and the goals of BluePill are not fully met
by such works or any straightforward combination of them.
For commercial products we can attempt a qualitative
comparison. Specialized vendors offer custom virtualization
solutions that combine ideas also seen in academic literature
(trapping kernel and user-space calls, special instructions, and
accesses to areas like the PEB) with robust implementations,
supposedly stealth for their proprietary nature. They often ship
valuable plugins (e.g., for forensic analysis) and automation
infrastructure to encode recurrent actions via scripts. When
it comes to aiding dissection, to the best of our knowl-
edge not much is offered, and no solution pursues similar
goals or the holistic approach of BluePill. Some systems
support mouse/keyboard interaction with the sandbox, leaving
to analysts the responsibility not to spook a sample by, e.g.,
launching a tool. Fewer mention analyses in IDA Pro or
Volatily of post-mortem dumps or possibly online during
execution, but even in the latter case we found no evidence of
technical improvement over the features of open VMI systems
(Table II).
IV. FRAMEWORK
Our BluePill implementation targets 32-bit and 64-bit Win-
dows malware. As DBI engine we use Pin [19], which is
largely popular in security research as it offers intuitive APIs
to place instrumentation at different granularity levels [18].
The manipulations we perform are not specific to Pin2, thus
we believe the approach is portable to other DBI systems.
The section is organized as follows. We first detail the
upper layer that controls what the sample sees and asks of the
system, including its time behavior. Next we discuss how we
provide introspection capabilities for an execution, and how
we shield the latter from artifacts that characterize the very
same underlying DBI execution mechanism. We then detail
how the system presented this far can accommodate program
analyses to aid dissection, and conclude by discussing how
users can extend BluePill with insights from the analysis.
2With the exception of its native debugging interface, which for engines
that miss one could be devised following the implementation strategy of [53].
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A. Target Platform Simulation Layer
To discuss the implementation of this upper layer we will
refer to how we alter the environment perceived by a sample
when running in VirtualBox with a Windows image equipped
with common, conspicuous analysis tools. Choosing a different
hypervisor should not require any major changes, as artifacts
known for instance for VMware and KVM can be hidden in
the same ways. BluePill can also be used in bare-metal setups.
As for analysis tools we consider programs serving different
purposes, such as IDA Pro, LordPE, ProcessHacker, Scylla,
the SysInternals suite, WireShark, and others3.
Instead of a cloaked VM where custom drivers and loaders
hide a subset of known VM artifacts (§II-A) we target a vanilla
hypervisor setup, installing also hypervisor guest additions
as they provide handy features normally banned in analysis
scenarios. The mechanism we use to hide its artifacts can also
be used to tailor features of the environment (we detail them
in §IV-E) and meet the expectations of targeted samples.
We build on the observation that samples most notably
fingerprint the following aspects of an execution environment:
• Virtualization. In addition to red pills for instruction-level
differences [16], revealing aspects include contents of
system firmware tables (SMBIOS strings, ACPI tables),
contents and position in memory of specific structures
(e.g., Interrupt Descriptor Table, Task State Segment), and
I/O ports (e.g., historically used to detect VMware).
• Hardware characteristics. Some feature can reveal either
a target victim or a virtual machine: CPU model, core
count, MAC address family, number of adapters, presence
of smart card readers, disk size, serial numbers, etc.
• Windows installation. Samples can inspect context infor-
mation like time zone, language, uptime, install date and
so on, especially targeted one. Hypervisors also introduce
characteristic registry entries, processes, and drivers.
• Applications. The presence of a specific software pro-
gram might represent a necessary condition to trigger a
payload, an adversary that needs to be disarmed (e.g., a
firewall or antivirus product), or more simply a sufficient
condition for evasion (e.g., an analysis tool).
• User artifacts. Fresh Windows installations are suspicious
for a sample, which may look into installed applications,
navigation history, recently used files, etc.
While using images with a realistic wear-and-tear state [54]
is recommended for user artifacts, the other aspects require
that portions of an execution be monitored and altered when
needed. We place hooks on the following execution items:
• Special instructions: cpuid, int, rdtsc and others can
reveal hardware features, elapsed time, and debuggers.
• Library calls: we monitor APIs that deal with files,
registry keys, GUI events, hardware features, drivers, pro-
cesses, pipes, DLLs, network, mutexes, and time sources.
• System calls: samples can use them to achieve (via Nt
user-mode wrappers exported by Windows in ntdll.dll or
via direct ASM calls using for instance sysenter or
int 2e) the interactions described above for libraries
more covertly.
• Windows Management Instrumentation: WMI queries can
reveal OS setup, installed applications, and devices.
• Process environment. Aspects of the execution environ-
ment like the PEB can reveal processor and system infor-
mation upon inspection (e.g., CPU cores, local debugger).
We refer the reader to the supplementary material (§A)
and the source code for their details. For the sake of a more
accurate and effective instrumentation, we place probes at the
lowest possible level of the software stack: in this way we
handle in a single place multiple library functions that in turn
invoke the same system call or helper, as well as direct system
calls that malware authors use to hinder manual code analysis.
To identify which operations should be monitored, we
started from a basic set of instrumentations and gradually
extended it by running BluePill against programs designed to
fingerprint analysis environments (including, but not limited
to, Al-Khaser, Pafish, SEMS, and VMDE), and analyzing a
large body of techniques from white papers and resources from
ethical hackers (e.g., [55], [56], [35], [57]). The techniques we
discovered fall in 8 categories: artifacts when executing in a
debugger, file operations, GUI features, hardware fingerprint-
ing, running processes, registry contents, timing differences
and time stalling techniques, and WMI queries.
Some system calls belong to multiple categories: for in-
stance, samples can use NtQuerySystemInformation to
reveal information regarding processes, perform raw firmware
queries, and detect system drivers. Moreover, distinct patterns
can oftentimes be dealt with using the same machinery: for
instance, cloaking certain registry keys or active GUI windows
is useful to hide conspicuous aspects of analysis tools (e.g.,
IDA Pro, ProcMon) as well as of VirtualBox. Overall, we
were able to detect and counter more than 100 instances of
anti-analysis patterns in our experiments.
Fast Forward Time: The time behavior of a process is
another aspect that we attempt to oversee. Windows offers
many time sources and timer functions that a sample can use to
let automatic analyses time out before carrying any harm, and
to hinder debugging sessions if the analyst does not dismantle
them manually. Samples may not just perform multiple sleep
calls, but also check the time elapsed across them to detect
mitigation strategies based on time fast forwarding.
To counter these techniques, patching time-related calls in a
sample independently could result in exposing an inconsistent
state to it, i.e., the different time sources would not be
synced. One may instead intercept time-related operations at
hypervisor level, and artificially accelerate the guest’s clock.
Such a strategy should however distinguish between operations
happening because of the sample from those naturally occur-
ring in Windows libraries and internals, as accelerating time
indiscriminately could easily lead to system instabilities [17].
We adopt a scheme that manipulates the timer behavior
of a process: although it may not be trivial to implement in
general [17], the DBI abstraction facilitates it as it confines
the effects to the process under analysis.
Our strategy comprises two parts. For each time-stalling
call, we fast forward the execution by accumulating the
3More can just be added by enumerating their artifacts in the current hooks.
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requested time quantity in an internal data structure, while
the execution is actually suspended for a short amount of time
only (say a few ms). When we observe multiple calls to some
delay primitive4 with the same time quantity or call site of a
previous invocation, we accumulate the requested quantity and
let the execution continue: this is useful to defeat adversarial
sleep loops, where a sample achieves long pause intervals by
using one or more short sleep operations repeated in cycle(s).
Eventually we use the accumulator to fake results for time
queries that a sample may perform, e.g., once timers expire.
We observe that samples can use different timing primitives in
tandem (e.g., rdtsc and GetTickCount) across sequences
of sleep operations to check for consistency too. We fake
the results for each second query by adding to the value
produced for the first invocation a quantity made of the
time accumulated for any timer operation, plus a value either
constant or proportional to the time elapsed in the VM.
This scheme can counter red pills that measure execution
time for instructions that take longer to execute in a hyper-
visor [30], and we use it also to hide the overhead of DBI
and of generic analyses built on top of BluePill such as the
taint tracking of Figure 2(c). While this strategy proves to be
effective on the samples we study, it does not claim to be gen-
eral, and like most dynamic analyses is ill-suited against time
queries operated via an external time source [29] or indirect
techniques5. Still, we believe it represents a building block
towards a more robust strategy, and its design can hopefully
be extended (e.g., considering surrounding instructions [58])
to counter new schemes that may appear in the future.
B. Introspection Layer
We now move to detailing the upper layer for introspection.
For instruction-level introspection we use PinADX [20] to
present debuggers like IDA Pro with a view of the program
state as if the transformations and JIT compilation orchestrated
by DBI were not present. Compared to traditional debugging
solutions, breakpoints are transparent to the code being exe-
cuted (§II-C, [20]), defeating red pills for software breakpoints
and more general checksumming sequences (found, e.g., in
recent strains of the ZeuS trojan). Another advantage is that
performance is affected only around breakpoints and when
single-stepping [20], while full speed execution is ensured for
most of the application: this can be valuable in the presence
of unpacking sequences and other heavy-duty operations.
We then devise a new mechanism for stealthy patching
in user-space debugging that could be useful in domains
other than malware analysis. We allow users to make code
changes of arbitrary length when debugging: we redo the JIT
compilation of the affected instructions adding trampolines
that go unnoticed by memory reads from the sample, as DBI
makes them point to the original (non-jitted) addresses [59].
The mechanism can thus defeat anti-tampering patterns and
shield analysts in the common practice of altering instructions
in a sample to force its internal logic. Optionally, we can hide
the pages containing the patches with the technique of [18],
which shepherds memory accesses to sensitive regions with
a shadow page table maintained by the analysis: in this case
we raise an exception to simulate unmapped memory. We use
it also in another layer (§IV-C) to provide a consistent view
of memory by hiding the artifacts (e.g., sections) of the DBI
engine. We refer the reader to [18] for implementation details.
Instruction-level introspection and patching are accessible
via the popular GDB remote server protocol from IDA Pro and
compatible debuggers. As for high-level introspection abilities,
we implement a mechanism to track system calls and library
functions that are of interest to analysts. We solve symbols
and addresses in a library when Pin loads its image, while for
system calls we extract from ntdll.dll names and ordinals
for the current Windows version.
C. DBI Artifacts Anti-Evasion Layer
DBI engines are transparent to benevolent code [59], but as
we observed in §II-C a meticulous adversary can reveal them
in several subtle ways. This aspect is crucial when designing
DBI-based malware analyses. [18] studies DBI evasions and
shows how to counter them with a library of mitigations more
comprehensive and efficient than prior attempts [60]. We build
on this anti-evasion library to get protection against many
evasion attacks for Pin including, but not limited to, leaking
the real instruction pointer, probing the consistency of memory
permissions and contents, and exposing engine internals.
When developing BluePill we contributed to [18] by dis-
mantling a remarkable technique observed in recent releases of
VMProtect and in a few samples from the dataset discussed in
the supplementary material. To the best of our knowledge, this
evasion was new in the DBI detection landscape. When code
causes a single-step exception by setting the CPU trap flag to
1 with a popfd instruction, Pin triggers an internal exception
and crashes. An adversary program can register a handler for
this scenario and also check where it is being called: simply
passing the exception from Pin to the application would expose
Pin. We thus handle the original exception in Pin, and forge a
new one at the next instruction: Pin does not intercept it, and
when the program’s internal handler does, it is fine with it.
We then address two surfaces left uncovered by [18] with
countermeasures tailored to the malware domain: namely, we
tackle time-based detections and artifacts when debugging.
The fast forwarding mechanism of §IV-A can handle both
low-level time attacks on instructions and branches in DBI [23]
and attacks found in malware that measure the overhead of a
generic dynamic analysis. In early tests our technique proved
to be more robust than the one of [60], which traps reads from
the KUSER_SHARED_DATA kernel structure shared on a user
page and rewrites values using an ad-hoc divisor supplied for
each sample by the user. Apparently [60] could not keep up
with the possibly more complex timing detection patterns from
recent malware and executable protectors that we tried, and
also accounts for fewer time sources than ours.
4We hook user-space functions and instructions for internal time sources,
including high-resolution ones. Hardware timers for drivers are out of scope.
5While their use in malware is undocumented, low-level indirect measure-
ments (e.g., with a counter thread [61] or by racing in two threads nop with
virtualization-sensitive cpuid [29]) could cripple BluePill and any existing
systems. In our context they may draw however the analyst’s attention, who
can then patch the problematic sequence.
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2020.2976559
Copyright (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. Y, XXX 2020 9
The combination of [18] and our time mitigations makes
BluePill withstand currently documented DBI evasions. For
instance, a recent work [23] reports on several old and newly
discovered weaknesses of Pin: in our tests BluePill overcame
all the patterns that can apply to Windows. As for malware
in the wild and DBI evasions we can make two observations.
Some techniques typically meant for “other” adversaries can
inadvertently reveal DBI: this is the case of the PAGE_GUARD
page protection modifier that malware writers and packers
use as anti-unpacking technique, but is also well-known to
challenge DBI engines [18]. In our experiments we also
found evidence of malware featuring DBI-specific evasions,
for instance in samples protected with PELock that attempt to
leak the real instruction pointer using FPU instructions.
As for debugging artifacts, this aspect has received rather
little attention in the DBI literature. PinADX might struggle
with exception handling patterns from the malware realm,
failing to pass a caught exception to the sample being de-
bugged. We wrote an extension that instructs Pin to pass the
exception to the sample as the analyst detaches the debugger
for a moment, and waits for its reattaching before resuming
execution in the sample’s handler. We then cloak artifacts
that appear under PinADX such as the BeingDebugged
flag in the PEB being set to 1. We test our implementation
against over 100 red pills for debuggers from popular works
of Ferrie [35], Leitch [57], and Branco et al. [55], [56]. We
also observed that while samples armored with recent releases
of VMProtect and Themida detect tools like ScyllaHide, the
technique behind our debugger currently goes unnoticed.
D. Integration with Program Analyses
We now discuss how the implementation presented this far
can back program analysis capabilities over evasive samples.
[18] reports that about 95 works in recent years used DBI
primitives to back popular security research. Among this
wealth of automatic techniques there are program analyses
that could be valuable also in manual dissection: consider,
e.g., symbolic execution [62], taint analysis [63], or forced
multi-path execution [64]. As a case study, we explore how
taint analysis can help experts pinpoint and dismantle tar-
geted checks and new evasions as part of a human-centered
feedback-loop mechanism, where the analysis can be applied
surgically instead of blindly as in automatic approaches.
Taint analysis can determine which computations are af-
fected by predefined input sources [63]. Some works have
explored it in the malware domain, for instance to detect
flows of user-entered data leaving a browser’s scope [65]
or to intercept keystrokes meant for another process [8].
The approach we follow is different as in BluePill data is
selectively tainted at the analyst’s command.
We use a fork of libdft [66], which offers byte-level tagging
granularity and efficiently tracks data flows across general-
purpose registers and memory. We updated its code to work
with new Pin releases and Windows prototypes and structures.
We let the user choose when to treat as taint source specific
(even individual) library/system calls or memory regions (e.g.,
the PEB); sources can be configured or disabled in the GUI
anytime during debugging, thus not only before execution
starts. Selectivity helps also when using distinct taint seeds
to distinguish sources, as the large encoding space otherwise
required to separately account for many sources upfront could
result in a large footprint for the shadow memory of the taint
engine, degrading performance and possibly undermining the
feasibility of the approach. We found 8 seeds to be enough in
our experiments, with a space occupancy of 1 byte per address
maintained in the shadow memory of libdft.
E. Customizing and Extending the System
Observe-check-replace hooks are a crucial component in
our design, and one of our goals is to let users tweak
existing hooks or add new ones to meet the expectations of a
sample. As mentioned in §IV-A we arrange hooks by 8 artifact
categories. To offer a consistent view of the system across
complex sequences of checks, hooks within the same category
share a list of features that should be masked (e.g., artifacts)
or materialized (e.g., additional languages) in queries about
the system. We alter the perception of files, registry entries,
running processes, IPC objects (e.g., mutexes), loaded libraries
and drivers, hardware and firmware strings, Windows settings
(e.g., languages), and GUI elements, as well as information
accessible via WMI (e.g., BIOS serial, MAC address, CPU
temperature and fan statistics, installed firewalls and anti-virus
products). Users can tailor such lists in the configuration file
or dynamically when debugging using the GUI (Figure 2).
Entries are typically strings that can be added and removed6.
The simplicity of DBI primitives allows for quick prototyp-
ing of hooks to counter targeted checks or newly discovered
anti-analysis techniques. For system and API calls, the user
can write C++ code that is executed when entering or returning
from the function, and register it by specifying the name
of the function and the arguments needed for inspection or
manipulation (we provide some examples in §VI-C). Also as
we said hooks can access Windows headers and functions
directly to inspect and alter the state. We are currently working
on a mechanism to load hooks dynamically via a DLL so that
debugging sessions are not interrupted by changes that need
recompilation. From a methodological perspective we would
like instead to explore the design of a domain specific language
for rewriting API results in active monitoring frameworks.
V. DISCUSSION
BluePill shall not be considered a sandbox, nor an automatic
system for analyzing evasive malware. Our goal is to bridge
the automatic and manual analysis processes: we offer an
environment where dissection can (i) happen without incur-
ring the anti-analysis hassle that characterize either or both
stages, and (ii) benefit from capabilities missing in previous
approaches, e.g., stealthy instruction patching, cloaking of
tools, and surgical use of program analyses (§III-B, IV-D). We
target a gap between literature and malware analysis practice,
for when in the daily practice the automatic analysis of a
6Updates are needed when a sample introduces objects mimicking artifacts
of an active monitoring system to test its robustness. We encountered such
adversarial strategies only with PEB-related debugger red pills.
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complex evasive sample (a well-studied problem per se) is
not sufficient and human analysts proceed with its dissection
(e.g., for new outstanding threats).
In our process-level active monitoring approach (§II-B) DBI
lets us devise an execution environment stealthy but also
easy to extend. Analysts can tweak it to detect and react to
previously unsupported anti-analysis or targeted checks (we
provide examples in §VI-C), dodging many low-level details
involving the underpinnings of the Windows kernel. Rewriting
more behaviors than the ones currently supported by BluePill
is possibly confined to an implementation job. The price we
pay for this flexibility is that we cannot analyze ring-0 flows.
The usage of DBI as basic building block has the advantage
of better interposition capabilities (crucial for achieving the
dissection features listed in Table II) and not having to
deal with semantic gaps (§II-A). However it introduces an
abstraction layer that could be easier to detect with respect to
VMI. In §VI we show that the countermeasures we adopt were
sufficient in our experiments for BluePill to go unnoticed by
prominent armored malware, and that our users could easily
extend the system to deal with evasive and targeted samples
that commercial vendors struggled with. We will monitor
developments in VMI technology, hoping they will allow us
to explore a porting (at least partial) of the approach to it.
Our design is vulnerable to unknown techniques. With bare-
metal analysis as the only sound way to go [12], automat-
ically characterizing evasive behaviors is a compelling open
problem: even designs in principle stealthy like Ether [44]
were later evaded using defects of the underlying technologies
or other artifacts. Manual dissection often intervenes when
automatic analyses are inconclusive: we speculate that evasive
behaviors are unlikely to go unnoticed in this stage, and
BluePill may provide users with means to face them.
Traps and Pitfalls: In dynamic analysis systems it is
crucial to intercept interactions between a sample and the OS.
Process tracking-based mechanisms are affected by known pit-
falls originating, e.g., from incorrect replicas of OS semantics
or race conditions in state inspection [67]. A benefit of DBI is
that interposition takes place in the same process of the code
under analysis, enabling direct queries to the OS to reason on
the execution state. We took into account the recommendations
from [67] in the design and implementation of BluePill to
minimize the risk of inconsistent executions.
One must also consider that a sample may carry out its
flows using multiple processes (e.g., by injecting code to run
a remote thread, by loading a DLL as a standalone program
with rundll32, etc). DBI engines are equipped to deal with
them: we use the Child Process API of Pin to follow execution
from child/exec-ed processes and remote threads and control
it with DBI. Another subtlety lies in analyzing 32-bit samples
on 64-bit Windows. The WoW64 subsystem offers an OS
compatibility layer across the two architectures, and a 32-bit
sample can use it to exercise further anti-analysis techniques.
For instance, Windows maintains also a 64-bit PEB that 64-bit
processes can query. But as also the 32-bit sample can access
it, the system has to cloak it just like the 32-bit PEB.
VI. EVALUATION
We now illustrate a preliminary experimental investigation
of our system on a set of outstanding samples. We explore
how BluePill can aid analysts in dissecting complex armored
malware and in dealing with unsupported anti-analysis and
targeting techniques. To this end we collect the opinions of a
team of 6 ethical hackers trained in binary analysis and reverse
engineering, memory forensics, and virtualization technology.
While they are currently CS students, they regularly participate
in exclusive reverse engineering and hacking competitions
such as DEF CON. Being a minimal risk study, we applied for
expedited IRB review. We consider this an informal pre-study
that, may BluePill gain the interest of analysts, could pave the
way to a later extensive in-field study of usable security [68].
A. Preliminary Tests
The version of BluePill employed in the study was tested for
robustness against the top-1000 armored samples in the Virus-
Total Academic March 2018 dataset (~64K PE32 samples). To
identify samples that attempt evasions, we first inspected the
dataset using the official Yara rules for anti-debug and anti-VM
detection. Since Yara rules encode patterns that are checked
statically, we assigned them with different weights to privilege
rules that capture definitely evasive patterns over sequences
that might see also legitimate uses (e.g., FindFirstFile)
and result in false positives. For each sample we summed
the weights of the matched rules, then we sorted the samples
accordingly to pick the top 1000.
In these tests we seek evidence for how malware in the wild
can put pressure on BluePill by drawing from a plethora of
anti-analysis techniques. As the dataset comes with no ground
truth for evasions, we monitor suspect activities involving
creation of files, processes, and registry entries, network com-
munication attempts, and uses of the Windows Crypto API. If
for a sample little or no activity is detected, we opt to run it
in a commercial sandbox and resort to manual dissection in
case of discrepancies. While this strategy would be ill-suited
to claim general resistance to evasion—which is not a goal
of this work—we found it a reasonable compromise to gain
confidence in the robustness of the implementation.
We ran the samples in a VirtualBox VM with Windows
7 32-bit, 4 CPU cores, and 3 GB of RAM. The VM image
came with applications, documents, and usage history inspired
by common sandbox design guidelines [54]. For external
communications, we set up an INetSim+Burp server VM to
simulate a number of classic services, as organization rules
forbid us from giving the samples unrestricted Internet access.
Each sample executed for 10 wall-clock minutes with time
fast forwarding enabled: as DBI degrades execution speed,
we conservatively allowed for a larger time budget compared
to commercial sandboxes (3-5 minutes). An inspection of the
logs backed the expectation that evasive checks typically take
place in early stages of execution, i.e., before a sample leaves
notable effects on the system. When no suspect activities were
detected, the prevalent cause was a crash in the Pin engine.
We measured for each sample how many anti-analysis
techniques BluePill dismantled: a significant ~92% fraction of
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Fig. 3. Number of distinct sets of anti-analysis techniques of a given size
for different frequency values across samples.
the considered samples resort to at least 4 distinct techniques,
while 47% of them adopt at least 8 different detections (we
observed as many as 15). Note that the actual number of
evasive attempts might be higher: for instance, evasions for
other virtualization technologies like VMware, QEMU, or Xen
are not tracked by BluePill, but are often present in malware.
To look into the nature of countered evasions, we studied
the overlap in used techniques between different samples using
itemset analysis. Figure 3 considers for each sample the set
of distinct anti-analysis measures it implements, and studies
the distribution of the sizes of those sets. In particular, for
a given set size a curve shows how the number of distinct
sets of that size depends on the minimum frequency of those
sets across the samples (support value). For instance, there are
80 distinct sets of 4 measures that arise each in at least 5%
of the samples (upper-left point in the chart). Similarly, there
are 9 distinct sets of 7 measures that arise each in at least
40% of the samples. This shows that assorted combinations
of anti-analysis measures are rather frequent in the collection.
As we move to presenting the findings of our informal user
study, we remark that further details on the experiments above
can be found in §B from the supplementary material.
B. Analysis of Highly Adversarial Samples
With the help of an independent malware analyst7 we se-
lected 45 samples exercising complex anti-analysis behaviors:
• 15 samples collected by Joe Security in 2013-2019 fea-
turing exotic evasions that their products can handle [69];
• 15 samples selected from the VirusTotal dataset as those
exhibiting at least 10 distinct anti-analysis techniques;
• 5 samples shielded by recent versions of the VMProtect,
ASProtect, Themida, Enigma, and PELock protectors;
• 10 samples reviewed in 2018-2019 on blogs of firms
such as FireEye, Talos, and TrendMicro as particularly
noteworthy for hindering automatic and manual analyses.
Using BluePill and monitoring utilities like ProcMon
cloaked by it we collected for each sample high-level in-
dicators like dropped or accessed files, contacted entities,
manipulated registry entries, and created processes. Our results
were consistent with reports collected in Joe Sandbox, a
leading commercial solution for evasive malware, and in two
cases showed actions missed by it. We used IDA Pro over the
GDB interface of BluePill to understand within a debugger
the inner structure and capabilities of each sample.
The entire process required ~4 person weeks. We list the
categories (§IV-A) for their anti-analysis patterns in Table IV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
DBG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
FILE X X X X X X X
GUI X X X X X X X X X X
HW X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PROC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
REG X X X X X X X X X X X
TIME X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
WMI X X X X X
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
DBG X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
FILE X X X X X X X X X
GUI X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
HW X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PROC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
REG X X X X X X X X X X
TIME X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
WMI X X X
TABLE IV
ANTI-ANALYSIS PATTERNS FROM SAMPLES (BY CATEGORY).
and report their hashes in Table V of the supplementary
material. To minimize the risk of bias in the selection process
that could favor BluePill, we asked the analyst to pick for the
study 12 samples that would best represent the nuisance of
adversarial techniques when dissecting complex malware.
We set up a laboratory for our users made of: (A) a Windows
7 VM as in a real-world scenario with common analysis tools
for a cloaked VirtualBox, (B) a similar VM with BluePill
for vanilla VirtualBox, (C) a Linux system with the QEMU-
based PyREBox system, and (D) a Xen-enabled Linux system
to run the DRAKVUF automatic analysis platform boosted
with pyvmidbg8. Due to licensing restrictions and not minor
financial aspects we leave out commercial products: yet the
reader may refer to §III-B for a qualitative comparison.
Tasks: After a 2-hour tutorial on the systems9 using
sample (42) as a demo, we asked the participants to give the
12 samples a spin in the systems and read the Joe Sandbox
reports. Showing them the reports mirrors the workflow of a
professional analyst that when about to dissect a sample first
runs it in the sandbox(es) available within the organization for
an initial characterization (§II-A).
We set up a feedback form and prepared analysis tasks
regarding a sample’s actions and structure, namely: code
revealed/exercised once multiple adversarial techniques are de-
fused; OS interactions and effects on the system that take place
using covert techniques and/or in later stages; and facts about
protection schemes in place. We defined 3 analysis setups:
one with (A), one with (B), and one where users could freely
use (C), (D), or both. We made a distribution of assignments
such that each user analyzed 6 distinct samples, using every
setup overall twice, while each sample was analyzed in each
setup exactly once. As the tasks were similarly difficult across
samples, no counterbalancing measures seemed to be needed.
Hurdles: What makes the samples bothersome to analyze
are the multi-colored ways10 in which they slow down and
break dissection. Adversarial patterns may be laid out in long
spread sequences so that analysts may miss some like in
(7), be interspersed in lengthy unpacking schemes (35), or
even be part of self-rewriting code (40) requiring a laborious
patching with breakpoints and single-stepping. Their anti-VM
techniques can reveal nearly all hypervisors behind analysts’
7With ten years’ experience as principal malware analyst in security firms.
8Currently the only maintained generic, open VMI debugging interface.
9Some participants had used PyREBox (4) and pyvmidbg (3) before.
10We report only one sample per technique among all those where present.
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workstations (26), while time-based red pills expose debug-
ging activities if not countered (32). Samples may look for
many known dissection tools like debuggers and monitoring
utilities in covert ways (40), using multiple threads (41) or
even altering Windows to prevent their reloading after killing
them (39). The VM may be left in an unusable state by wiping
essential disk or registry elements (9) and disabling Windows
features (36), forcing analysts to use forensic tools over full
memory dumps and disks to grasp the effects of a deployed
payload. Furthermore they represent a tough proving ground
for the DBI artifacts anti-evasion layer of BluePill (§IV-C).
Dissection and Feedbacks: The participants were able to
dissect all samples using BluePill, 8 with setup (A) leaving
out (26, 35, 39, 40), and 9 with setup (C/D) failing (26, 40,
43). For (A) some adversarial techniques broke the analysis
flow; for (C/D) the users exhausted the time budget of 3 hours
per sample before completing all tasks.
We received largely positive comments on how BluePill
facilitated the dissection process. All the users agreed on how
it allowed them to better focus on understanding the actions
and the dynamically revealed structure of a sample, without
the worry of having to start over as in (A) from the last
save point (§II-A) every time an unaccounted or mishandled
adversarial behavior kicked in. This was rather evident for
samples shielded by packers, especially (35): debugger cloaks
like ScyllaHide and TitanHide did not help in (A) when quirky
temporal and VM evasions were in place. Some evasions
can also be hard to locate in the first place: for instance
in (35) are part of lengthy complex unpacking code, (40) is
extremely annoying for the analyst as self-modifying code is
used to encode them, while in (26) the analyst has to dive into
Windows internals.
VMI-based solutions fared better for anti-debugging tech-
niques than (A), but left the users vulnerable to hypervisor
detections that they had to counter manually. For (D) users
also had to patch checks on CPU cores, as to debug over
hardware-assisted virtualization libvmi requires that only one
core be exposed to the guest or Windows would incur a blue
screen of death. They reported that although debugging via
VMI is technically very interesting and powerful, on a first
attempt they would still use (A) over (C) or (D) for speed
and usability. Criticisms involved difficulties in following
and controlling threads alongside the OS scheduler activities,
limited assistance in inspecting memory layout of a process
and symbols, and coarse grain of the monitoring facilities, if
available. The users commended the scripting capabilities of
(C) especially if they were to be applied in ring-0 or forensic
analysis, but were unhappy with the slow working that adds
to QEMU’s one, and concerned about the conspicuous custom
opcodes used by its in-guest agent for monitoring.
Other positive comments on BluePill involved the interac-
tive altering of the exposed environment (e.g., CPU model
and cores) as the expectations of a sample became clear
without having to restart dissection, while two users believed
the stealth patching mechanism could be useful also in other
applications besides malware analysis.
A more interesting fact we witnessed were uses of the
system that we did not anticipate. Two participants—of their
own accord and without influencing one another—added hooks
unrelated to evasions, in order to dig on behaviors surfaced in
the Joe reports or to alter their effects. One user observed
PowerShell activities in the report of (43) and added a hook
that with a regular expression intercepts the launching of
scripts via registry entries and APC and yields to the debugger
like a semantic breakpoint. The other user was worried about
destructive actions from (9) and wrote a hook to rewire
calls to components like bcdedit (it alters OS boot) to a
dummy executable created for the occasion, and another hook
to prevent a sample from disabling certain system services
and rebooting the machine. The user also liked how these
hooks would be reusable when analyzing samples with similar
behaviors, e.g., (36).
We came to believe that eliminating anti-analysis techniques
creates a baseline to streamline and effectively assist analysts
in subsequent core tasks: we look forward to tackling this
research direction. In the two users’ opinion it would have
been significantly more difficult to encode such actions using
debugger scripting even in products like IDA Pro, while the
VMI mechanisms of PyREBox or DRAKVUF were not as
appealing as using DBI primitives, as the capabilities of VMI
are currently too low-level in terms of interfaces and also more
oriented to observing rather than altering behaviors.
C. Handling Unsupported Techniques
To explore how analysts may turn insights from inspection
into extensions to BluePill, we asked the 3 most engaged
participants to analyze 3 more samples. The first two are
targeted and would stay dormant even on bare-metal systems if
the Windows installation does not meet certain characteristics,
while the third features an unprecedented assortment of anti-
analysis techniques. The users were not given any prior knowl-
edge of the samples. The outcome of this experiment suggests
that stealthy introspection capabilities, occasionally combined
with taint tracking in the face of lengthy sequences, facilitate
valuable insights that may be easy to turn into extensions
thanks to the simplicity of DBI mechanisms.
Targeted Malware: The two targeted samples are bank-
ing trojans: NukeBot, which attacks French companies, and
Retefe, a strain famous for threatening mainly Swiss financial
institutions. According to Joe Security, both samples did not
initially reveal their behavior in full inside their state-of-the-
art sandboxing solution [70], [24]. We briefly report on the
findings of the three participants, and how they configured
and extended BluePill to analyze the samples in full.
The initial run of NukeBot in sandbox mode (§II-D)
revealed a number of files being dropped along with a
copy of the Firefox browser, which is then executed result-
ing in an error message in French. The logs contained an
IsDebuggerPresent call, multiple checks on free disk
space, and a large number of GetKeyboardLayout invoca-
tions within a DLL loaded after Firefox was launched. When
the team moved to debugging it, they discovered that NukeBot
uses a DLL side-loading attack affecting old versions of the
browser to load a malicious payload embedded in the custom
DLL. As the initial stage of the DLL is not obfuscated, they
This is the author's version of an article that has been published in this journal. Changes were made to this version by the publisher prior to publication.
The final version of record is available at  http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2020.2976559
Copyright (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted. For any other purposes, permission must be obtained from the IEEE by emailing pubs-permissions@ieee.org.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. XX, NO. Y, XXX 2020 13
could easily see uses of the GetThreadUILanguage and
GetKeyboardLayout to check user interface and keyboard
language against French. As either check is sufficient, the
participants opted to add the following hook when returning
from GetKeyboardLayout:
// <windows.h> in W namespace, HKL type for input locale ID
VOID GetKeyboardLayoutHookExit(void* ret) {
W::HKL *tmp = (W::HKL*)ret;
*ret = (W::HKL)0x040c040c; /* French */
}
A new run in sandbox mode revealed the same extensive
credential stealing activities that Joe Security analysts saw only
upon updating their VM image with the new layout [70].
For the second case study, when analyzing Retefe in
sandbox mode BluePill recorded one cpuid occurrence,
a number of apparently benign registry queries, an
IsDebuggerPresent call, and a WMI query, followed by
a large number of short sleeps before terminating. The WMI
query SELECT * FROM WIN32_OPERATINGSYSTEM
raised suspicion among the team, who marked its output
as tainted and followed taint propagation. While the query
returns a data structure with 66 members, Retefe checks the
sole MUILanguages[] field to see whether en-US is the
only MUI pack (§II-D) installed in the system.
Joe Security reports [24] that within two days they created a
new VM with multiple MUI packs and managed to run Retefe
in full. Our users made simple modifications11 to the existing
WMI hook to rewrite the query result: after the changes Retefe
dropped the 7zip tool to extract its components from an archive
and connect to the TOR network as expected.
New Evasions: Furtim is a sample that in 2016 drew
the attention of analysts due to its staggering amount of anti-
analysis techniques, a clear sign of the vast expertise of its
author [71]. It could evade all known dynamic analysis solu-
tions with the sole exception of the bare metal-based sandbox
of Joe Security [3], [71]. Furtim performs over 400 adversarial
checks, including registry entries and service executable names
from even very rare security programs, and artifacts from
major virtualization and sandboxing environments [71].
Furtim terminates prematurely when in a VM or sandbox,
and when it detects popular analysis tools it retaliates to the
analyst by killing them only at a later stage to disrupt progress.
Its checks are rather articulate: for instance it uses cpuid to
check product brand strings against a blacklist, and later makes
a sanity check between CPU model and available cores. When
it looks up loaded drivers some entries lead to an immediate
termination and others to a later evasion. [3] details checks
related to network, DLLs, hardware and BIOS strings, window
titles, registry keys, and Direct3D.
When our users analyzed Furtim, BluePill lacked one
hook to withstand all the actions listed in [3]: system call
NtEnumerateKey takes a registry key handle opened via
NtOpenKey and writes in a buffer the value of the subkey at
the given index. Furtim uses it to look for VirtualBox artifacts
related to disks, CD-ROM drives, and Direct3D properties. We
kept the existence of [3] to us, and for the sake of analysis we
informed the team that had all evasions be countered Furtim
would drop an executable and add it to autostart programs.
They first ran it in sandbox mode to see what anti-analysis
techniques were identified, which included two cpuid red
pills, a call to NtQueryInformationProcess to expose
debuggers, and two to NtQuerySystemInformation to
fingerprint drivers and processes. They thus marked the output
of NtQuerySystemInformation as tainted and followed
taint propagation, which revealed that Furtim uses standard
wide-char string processing functions to parse the tainted data.
They then hooked such functions to print their arguments
and see which strings were processed during the execution.
Once suspicious strings containing VBOX started to appear,
they used our system call tracing feature to intercept possible
families of calls that were not already hooked, and inspected
the memory pointed to by their arguments to see whether such
a string could originate from there. This approach exposed
all the uses of NtEnumerateKey mentioned above, so they
implemented the following code to massage the results by
rerouting the query to a random key not present in the system:
void NtEnumerateKeyHookEntry(syscall_t *sc,
CONTEXT *ctx, SYSCALL_STANDARD std) {
KEY_INFORMATION_CLASS cl = (KEY_INFORMATION_CLASS)
sc->arg2;
if (cl == KeyBasicInformation) {
PKEY_BASIC_INFORMATION str = (PKEY_BASIC_INFORMATION)
sc->arg3;
if (wcsstr(str->Name, L"VBOX") != NULL) {
size_t nameLen = wcslen(str->Name);
memcpy(str->Name, RANDOM_KEY_WSTR(nameLen), nameLen); }
}
}
Unfortunately Furtim still terminated prematurely. We then
suggested to trace library calls with BluePill: by a closer in-
spection one additional check via EnumDisplaySettings
not described in [3] emerged. Furtim uses this API to retrieve
information on the graphic modes supported by a device,
and the participants rewrote the behavior exposed for device
\\.\DISPLAY1 as it revealed VirtualBox. We could not find
evidence of this evasion technique in previous literature.
VII. CONCLUSION
BluePill embodies a holistic approach to reconcile divergent
interests and requirements of automatic and manual malware
analysis, easing the dissection of complex samples with new
capabilities while preserving transparency. As a building block
immune from semantic gaps, DBI backs it in useful execution
monitoring and altering capabilities, facilitates user extensions
and customizations, and paves the way to exploring more
program analyses. We share our implementation hoping that
security researchers and professionals may benefit from it.
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